ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF IGAD IN THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN SOMALIA: A CASE STUDY IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA

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Abstract
Government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, and since then, several actors were engaged in providing humanitarian support, re-storing peace and stability and providing platforms for negotiation. After IGADD was transformed to IGAD in 1996, its member states solidly joined their efforts to reduce threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability. Therefore, the study focused on answering two research questions including What effect have humanitarian roles of IGAD had in conflict resolution in Somalia? And What effect have IGADs’ use of peacekeeping missions had in the resolution of conflict in Somalia? The study was based on functionalism theory, with both quantitative and qualitative research methodology. Using questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions, the target population of the study was 670 individuals where 200 were randomly sampled for the administration of the questions. The study findings showed that IGAD plays a crucial role in humanitarian service, peacekeeping missions and negotiation platforms which either prevents the escalation of conflict or solves existing conflicts to a certain extent.

Key words: Humanitarian Services, Peace Keeping, IGAD, Conflict resolution

Introduction
Government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, and since then, several actors were engaged in providing humanitarian support, re-storing peace and stability and providing platforms for negotiation. After IGADD was transformed to IGAD in 1996, its member states solidly joined their efforts to reduce threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability by establishing necessary mechanisms for consultation and co-operation in order to solve disputes and differences among member states. Therefore, three key areas of interest were identified: Humanitarian affairs and management, food security and development of infrastructure, environment, and prevention of conflicts. Additionally, the Somalia conflicts introduced a new topic and series of discussions to give IGAD the role to facilitate conflict prevention and peace initiatives in Somalia and other horn of Africa.

IGAD was involved in the condition therein due to failure of regional initiatives put by AU. Before mission of Africa in Somalia (AMISOM), several harmony conferences took place to come up with the best platform to make the different Somali faction and clan elders able to negotiate on sharing of power and government restoration. Almost three decades down the line, complete peace and stability has not been attained yet. To answer this question, several studies have been undertaken in the past surrounding the conflict in Somalia among them are: the role of regional and international organizations in resolving Somali conflict: the case of IGAD by K. Mulugeta. This study mostly emphasized on the role of IGAD in establishing TFG and did not elaborate on other roles. The role of regional organizations in peacekeeping in Africa; a case of IGAD in Somalia by Braza is another study conducted in this field which mostly focused on peacemaking process and barely touch on other roles of IGAD and finally conflict resolution in Somalia; learning from failed mediation processes by LM Makhubela is another study that focused on understanding the success and failure of previous peace process particularly the 2000 Arta process and 2004 Mbagathi process. All these studies have emphasized on one aspect or one role of IGAD without bringing in other roles that may result positive or negative implications of the researched topic. This has necessitated the need for this research to investigate the role of IGAD in Somalia Conflict by looking at three aspects; its humanitarian role, effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions and explore achievements and
challenges in providing negotiation platforms. The study analyzed the role of the intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) in the conflicts of Somalia. Therefore, the study focused on answering two research questions including What effect have humanitarian roles of IGAD had in conflict resolution in Somalia? And What effect have IGADs’ use of peacekeeping missions had in the resolution of conflict in Somalia? The outcome of the research may be useful to other researchers, government of Somalia, IGAD and other entities including regional and international organizations involved in conflict management.

**Literature**

Most conflicted areas are susceptible to humanitarian crisis, and these has led to explosion of the condition and worsening the situation. Human need theory has been widely accepted to explain the reason for satisfaction and meeting the basic human need as a basis of resolution in conflict, Burton (2011). Through his conflict resolution theory in relation to human needs theory, Burton has explained the need for satisfaction of basic human need to aver conflict. The theory of Human needs (HNT) which was established in the 1970s and 1980s as a theory of human behavior that is holistic is based on the assumption that human has needs that are basic that requires to be fulfilled for stable societies to be maintained (Burton, J.)

The theory believes that human participate in conflict situation and competitively struggling at all levels that are social to satisfy their priority and needs that are universal like safety, recognition of identity and growth process. They work hard increasingly to get their environment controlled to ensure these needs are satisfied.

The basic needs are inadequate in some area due to their climatic condition like Somalia which is potentially resourceful, but its people are unable to realize it hence competition over the resources is seen. This was when the humanitarian assistance from IGOs become vital in providing food aid by UNHCR and shelter by IOM, the fight for primary needs is associated theoretically to theory of Frustration-Aggression that is focused on stimulus response assumption. After failing to fulfill their requirements, Human being get frustrated and this results to aggression and thus struggles. The difference between the theory of Human needs and the theory of frustrations aggression is that the HNT deals with needs that are absolute only whereas the other deals with desires as well as wants? Burton goes on to say that there are important values that are universal or human requirements, which compulsorily should be fulfilled for stability of a society. The theory therefore recommends the construction of institution that will help humans to fairly and equally meet their needs.

Cunningham (2008) gives an argument that human needs obstructions led to elimination of the sense of goals that mutually exclusive as Northern Ireland case 1969 on conflict explanation and attempt at settlement previously.

If the theory assumptions of this are right and these are certain needs of human and social stability, then the conflict solution must be the creation of environment in which these requirements can be fulfilled by all society’s segments. This is when the theory of human needs meets Burtons (1991).

IGAD plays a crucial role in humanitarian services in Somalia and horn of Africa at large. IGAD’s humanitarian role is categorized in to two categories. The first is by guiding, organizing and coordinating the humanitarian services of other international partners through partnership with UN agencies. IGAD advocates for the rights of Refugees and internally displaced people in the region and asks international partners to respond to the needs of those who are in need. IGAD is home to large numbers of displaced people and known home to 5.4 million Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) and two million refugees accounting for 65% and 55% of the IDPs and refugees in Sub Saharan Africa respectively. (IGAD)

IGAD like other international organizations is committed to support people affected by humanitarian crisis in the world and most especially in the IGAD region; known to be affected by many conflicts and natural disasters such as drought. IGAD is committed to facilitating and coordinating humanitarian aid for its affected population in the Horn of Africa and ensuring that aid workers and organizations can efficiently and safely deliver to those in need. The Executive Secretary His Excellency Mahboub Maalim during the recent commemoration of world humanitarian day emphasized that “Aid should be delivered on time and in appropriate places. IGAD can bring together all local and international actors to work jointly and efficiently putting people and communities at the forefront” (IGAD)

Amb Maalim added that IGAD has over the years committed to providing the necessary means to address and reduce humanitarian sufferings in the region through mediating between conflicted parties and work to end drought disaster emergencies in the region through its IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) Program.

AMISOM forces in Somalia on the hand provides medical support to the people of Somalia. The forces have medical clinics and experts in almost all their bases. The chronic, emergency and complicated medical cases from the public are also referred to these bases where they are attended by practitioners and the necessary treatment and advices given.

The second category is that IGAD member states host refugees from the region, Somalia being part of it where they provided space, security and facilitate provision of basic needs by the international organizations.

Due to the deteriorating security situation in the region, the leaders of IGAD member states issued a communiqué on 31st January 2005 meeting in Abuja, Nigeria. The main agenda of this meeting was the plan to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia. According to the communiqué, the Mission would “provide security support to the TFG and guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the reestablishment of peace and security including training of the police and the army” (IGAD communiqué). This decision from the summit was supported by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the African Union and authorized by the 24th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU that was held on 7th February, 2005.

In order to implement these decisions, the AU/ IGAD sent a Fact-Finding Mission on 14th February 2005 to determine among others the mandate, force, size, structure, and tasks of the peace support mission. IGASOM was intended to deploy up to 10,000 peacekeepers to Somalia with starting from April 2005 with expected cost of around US$413 million per annum (Mays 2005; and see News from Africa 2005).

The deployment plan was adopted at the 24th IGAD Council of Ministers on 18th March, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya and in the same meeting it was decided that only Sudan and Uganda would make the initial deployment of troops while the rest would provide logistical support and training of the Somali armed forces. The Council also decided to amend the constitution of IGAD to allow the deployment of IGASOM (IGAD Council of Ministers communiqué 2005). The UNSC had shown its support by authorizing 8,000 IGASOM troops to be deployed for six months, without including the frontline states. Furthermore, the UNSC decided to this a special and not to apply the arms embargo on Somalia for IGASOM, under resolution 1725 (2006).
However, the IGASOM was not deployed due to contrasting and conflicting minds between member states. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda stood by the idea while Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan showed strong reservations. Moreover, its deployment was also opposed by some opposing factions and the UIC in Somalia. Most importantly, the proposal lost financial support from the then leading powerful nations including the US (Bryden 2006). The US and its allies were reluctant to finance this idea while the front-line states were involved and instead opted to provide assistance to some warlords to hunt a handful of alleged terrorists. So, the deployment of IGASOM lacked financial and logistical support (Bryden).

When the deployment of IGASOM was delayed, Ethiopian government took an initiative of solely deploying its troops to help the TFG settle in Jowhar and then in Baidoa in 2005. To show support and solidarity to the newly formed government of Somalia, IGAD ministers organized their 26th meeting in Jowhar on 29th November 2005 (IGAD Council of Ministers 2005). The council urged the TFG to engage in dialogue but at the same time warned those who deliberately obstruct the peace building process that they will take action against them including referring to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

With the intensification of the insurgency, IGAD showed its support for the TFG as a legitimate government in Somalia that needed to be assisted by the international community. Thus, it pushed for the deployment of the African Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia. This is mission of peacekeeping carried out by IGAD with help of AU and approval by UN under Resolution 1744. In September 2006, African Union approved to send mission of keeping peace to Somalia and in February 2007 AMISOM was deployed for six months. By then they had the authoritative command to give support to the then TFIs in their endeavor to stabilizing the situation of Somalia as well as enhance process of reconciliation as well as dialogue. They were also mandated to make available the humanitarian assistance provision, bring out conditions that are conducive for stabilization that is long term, constructing again as well as growth in Somalia. The soldiers deployed were 5250 representing 2700 from Uganda and 2550 from Burundi till 2010 when the neighboring countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya joined the mission to reinforce existing forces on the ground.

**Materials and Methods**

The study was based on functionalism theory, which states global peace can be attained via cooperation that is functional by the international organizations work (like IGAD) and other actors. This study applied both quantitative and qualitative research methodology and used both secondary information gathered from existing literature and primary information from the field using questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. The target population of the study was 670 individuals representing government of Somalia, representative from IGAD office in Mogadishu, other diplomats particularly embassy staff from IGAD member states, civil societies and the public. Out of this, 200 hundred individuals were randomly sampled for the administration of the questions. A total of 130 questionnaires, 6 focus group discussions and 40 interviews were administered throughout the four administrative cities in the southern Somalia. Out of the 200 individuals sampled, 181 responded and participated in the research. The respondents represent 90.5% of the sample which the researcher deemed adequate and sufficient for purpose of data analysis. The majority (76%) of respondents were male while 24% were female. Only 10% of the respondents were in the bracket 21-30 years of age with 35% of
respondents being between 31-40 years while 30% were 41-50 and the remaining 25% were above 51 years. The middle 2 brackets 31-50 combined contributed the largest percentage 65%. Only 15% of the respondents were untrained (acquired only secondary education). About 28% of the respondents had diploma, 36% were university graduate which is the highest percentage of the respondents while 21% of the respondents attained post graduate level of education.

The data collected were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and the result tabulated, presented in graphs and percentage charts. Qualitative data were analyzed using descriptive summary report citing the proportion of respondents alongside their responses.

Results
IGAD’s Humanitarian Role
The first research question was to determine the role of humanitarian service in the resolution of conflict in southern Somalia. The simple questionnaire item showed the findings in Table 1.

Table 1 Whether IGAD’s Humanitarian Aid Play a Role in Conflict Resolution in Southern Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researcher asked whether IGAD’s humanitarian services played a role in the conflict resolution and 69% of the respondents answered yes while 31% said no. The study further used focus group discussions to find out whether IGAD’s Humanitarian Aid Played a Role in Conflict Resolution. The compiled results are as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 Focus Group Result on Whether IGAD’s Humanitarian Aid Played a Role in Conflict Resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus group number</th>
<th>Member 1</th>
<th>Member 2</th>
<th>Member 3</th>
<th>Member 4</th>
<th>Member 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
A = Indicated agreement (i.e., verbal or nonverbal)
D = Indicated dissent (i.e., verbal or nonverbal)
SE = Provided significant statement or example suggesting agreement
SD = Provided significant statement or example suggesting dissent
NR = Did not indicate agreement or dissent (i.e., nonresponse)
As indicated in the table 2 above the researcher conducted 6 focus group discussion with five members each. Asking the question on whether IGAD’s humanitarian aid played a role in conflict resolution in Somalia 12 members indicated agreement, 9 members indicated agreement with significant statement, 4 indicated disagreement while another four indicated disagreements with significant statement and finally only one person did not indicate agreement or dissent. Percentage wise 70 of the focus group members have agreed with the question while 27 have disagreed and the remaining three did not agree or disagree.

The questionnaire item regarding the first objective of the study was to determine the effectiveness of IGAD’s humanitarian service. The results are presented using Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows that 19% of the respondent said its very effective, 43% said its effective, 20% said its less effective while 18% said it is totally not effective.

The FGD results are presented using Figure 2.
The focus group discussion on the effectiveness of IGAD’s humanitarian role, 6 out of 30 members representing 20% mentioned its very effective, 13 members representing 43% said its effective, 7 members equivalent to 23% said its less effective while the remaining 4, 13% said it’s not effective. Twelve members supported their answers with significant explanation as shown above.

The Effectiveness of IGAD’s Peace Keeping Missions

The findings on the measure of the effectiveness of the IGAD’s peace keeping missions is presented using Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less effective</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that 16% of the respondents said the peace keeping missions are very effective, 28% said it is effective, 38% said it is less effective while 18% marked it as not effective. On the other hand, then FGD results are presented using table 4.
Table 4 The Effectiveness of IGAD’s Peacekeeping Missions-FGD Result.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus group number</th>
<th>Member 1</th>
<th>Member 2</th>
<th>Member 3</th>
<th>Member 4</th>
<th>Member 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>VE*</td>
<td>VE</td>
<td>LE*</td>
<td>LE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>E*</td>
<td>E*</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>VE</td>
<td>NE*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>LE</td>
<td>LE*</td>
<td>LE</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>LE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NE*</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>LE</td>
<td>LE*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>NE*</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>VE*</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>LE*</td>
<td>VE*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The focus group discussions through table 4 shows that 17% of the members said peacekeeping missions are very effective, 37% said are effective, 30% said less effective and 17% not effective. About 12 members of the FGD groups explained their argument. The variations in these is presented in Table 5.

Table 5 Whether the Somali Conflict Can be Managed Better Without the Involvement of Peacekeeping Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researcher also asked the respondents whether this conflict can be managed better without the involvement of IGAD. About 72% of the respondents said no while 28% said yes as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3 whether the conflict can be managed better without peace keeping missions
Figure above on whether the conflict can be managed without the peace keeping missions, 67% of FGD members said no while 33% said yes. About 13 members have given significant explanation and is captured in the summary part of chapter five.

Discussions
IGAD’s Peace and Security Division is mandated to deal with issues related to Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs. The division has three main programme components, namely: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR), Political Affairs, and Humanitarian Affairs which in particular consists of Disaster Risk Management Programme & Alleviation and Mitigation of Humanitarian Crises (IGAD)

The humanitarian situation in Somalia is aggravated by a confluence of factors including violence, drought, increasing food prices, piracy, increasing inflation rate, and targeted killings of humanitarian workers (Kidist, M. 2009)

The research found out that IGAD’s humanitarian role cools the conflict situation or at least manages the outcome of the conflict but mostly depends on how soon humanitarian aid arrives. The respondents emphasised that conflict cannot be managed without addressing the humanitarian crisis resulted from the conflict which can further escalate the situation. This clearly confirms Human Need Theory which explained the reason for satisfaction and meeting the basic human need as a basis of resolution in conflict, Burton (2011). Through his conflict resolution theory in relation to human needs theory, Burton has explained the need for satisfaction of basic human need to avert conflict. The theory of Human needs (HNT) which was established in the 1970s and 1980s as a theory of human behavior that is holistic is based on the assumption that human has needs that are basic that requires to be fulfilled for stable societies to be maintained (Burton, J.) The earlier the intervention the better the result in managing the conflict (IGAD). Somalia is potentially resourceful country but most of its people are unable to realize while very few people are exploiting its resources. This led to frustration of majority of the population after failing to fulfill their requirements, Human being get frustrated and this results to aggression and thus struggles as explained by the theory of Frustration-Aggression that is focused on stimulus response assumption. Cunningham (2008) gives an argument that human needs obstructions led to elimination of the sense of goals that mutually exclusive. The result of the findings clearly conforms that of the literature review and majority of the respondents (69%) mention IGAD’s humanitarian plays a key role in resolving the conflict in Somalia. This happens either individual IGAD member states hosting refugees or IGAD as an organization advocating the rights for refugees and IDP throughout the horn of Africa, particularly those in Somalia. However, close to 40% of the participants have mention that IGAD’s humanitarian role is either less effective or not effective at all citing lack of IGAD’s direct involvement. IGAD’s humanitarian role is categorized in to two categories. The first is by guiding, organizing and coordinating the humanitarian services of other international partners through partnership with UN agencies and secondly it advocates for the rights of Refugees and internally displaced people in the region and asks international partners to respond to the needs of those who are in need. This can be improved by giving IGAD the mandate to lead all humanitarian services or at least allowing its direct involvement of humanitarian activities in the region. This would increase the effectiveness of humanitarian services hence fully contributing to conflict resolution.
Lessons learnt from the lack armed forces to defend the TNG from the warlords and opposing factions which ultimately resulted its failure and the then existing threats, has necessitated the need to have peacekeeping missions to protect the TFG. This has resulted IGAD head of states to issue a communiqué on 31st January 2005 meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on their plan to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGAD communiqué 2005) and later in 2005, the IGAD Foreign Ministry who came together in Nairobi confirmed the plan of deployment for IGASOM (IGAD Council of Ministers 2005) (Healy, 2005). However, the idea faced a lot of challenges before its implemented delaying the deployment of IGASOM troops. Due to this delay, Ethiopia took the initiative of deploying its own troops and helped TFG to settle in Jowhar. Ethiopia stated that, besides the intention of saving TFG, its national interest and security was at risk after the ICU threatened to invade her territory and had to take this step. Hans Morgenthau noted that interventions occur when national interest is at risk (Morgenthau, H. 1950). In September 2006, African Union approved to send mission of keeping peace to Somalia and in February 2007 AMISOM was deployed for six months to give support to the then TFIs in their endeavor to stabilizing the situation of Somalia as well as enhance process of reconciliation as well as dialogue. However, 14 years down the line, although the situation has improved, the threat still exist and Al-Shabab controls large part of South-central Somalia (Menkhaus 2009). Despite killing several of the Al-Shabaab leaders, did not weaken the strength of the insurgents (Kidist 2009) and Somalia armed forces are weak to defend the federal government from the existing threats. Consequently, and in line with this point, most of the participants (72%) of this research still believes that Somalia conflict cannot be managed without the involvement of IGAD lead peacekeeping missions. They have particularly mentioned that there is need to protect government bases, liberate new areas and help stabilize the newly liberated areas which Somalia armed forces alone cannot do. However, looking at the number of years AMISOM stayed and the amount of money spent on them, the effectiveness of this mission was questioned. 56% of the participants have said that the mission is either less effective or not effective at all pointing out the following: majority of the peacekeeping missions are from frontline IGAD member states where some have/had bad historic relationship with Somalia, each of IGAD member states has its own agenda behind sending peacekeeping forces, financial incapability of IGAD to run this mission on their own. The later has invited other powerful nations like USA, UK, EU who are interested in the horn of Africa and handicapped the mission to some extent and finally some nations supported the opposition fraction to undermine the mission. These challenges were anticipated for example IGAD Council of Ministers held a meeting in Nairobi on 18th March, 2005. The council proposed that Sudan and Uganda make the initial deployment. The rest of IGAD member states to perform logistics support and train Somalia armed forces (Kidist, M. 2009). The UNSC pledged its support by authorizing 8,000 IGASOM force to be deployed for six months, without including the frontline states from contributing troops but this was not materialized. Most significantly, the proposal did not get the required financial support from the leading powers including the US (Bryden 2006). The US was said to be reluctant to see the involvement of frontline states and was at that time providing assistance to some warlords to hunt a handful of alleged terrorists. Thus, IGASOM lacked financial and logistical support (Bryden).
References


